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"RARELY TRIED, AND ... RARELY SUCCESSFUL":
THEORETICALLY IMPOSSIBLE PRICE PREDATION
AMONG THE AIRLINES
CHRIS SAGERS*

ABSTRACT
Two large bodies of literature bearing on the competitive
health of the deregulated airlines are in sharp conflict: (1) the
volumes of judicial and academic output to the effect that the
phenomenon of predatory pricing is, as a practical matter, impossible; and (2) the similarly massive body of industry-specific
theory and empirical evidence that predation not only occurs in
airline markets, but has been a key tool to preserve market
power held by the surviving legacy carriers. This article seeks to
establish from the latter that the former is a poor basis for policy, especially if there is nothing really so special about airline
markets as to make predation uniquely likely there. This article
therefore offers a basically derivative, but essential, empiricism
to the largely theoretical predation debate.
No one has the right, and few the ability, to lure [anyone] into
reading another article on [predatory pricing] without some advance indication of its alleged contribution.
-George Stigler'

* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. My thanks to Peter
Carstensen for comments. Aaron Edlin also kindly corresponded with me on
certain points discussed here, and shared related work in progress. Also, despite
transatlantic travel and the inconvenient need to keep body and soul together,
Jessica Fajfar, Cleveland-Marshall J.D. summa cum laude 2008, provided me with
catastrophically underpaid research assistance for this paper. This was so despite
my frequent public mispronunciation of her name (It's FIFE-er).
I George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44 (1964)
(paraphrasing).
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[Still, and despite the allegedly persuasive force of the purely
afactual, theoretical argument against the very possibility of predation,] whatever exists

. . .

must be possible.

2
-Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
And in a similar manner, [Diogenes of Sinope] replied to one
who had been asserting [,] [by way of an argument of Zeno of
Elea,] that there was no such thing as motion, by getting up and
walking away.
-Diogenes Laertius3

S URELY ONE

of the least accurate claims in the Supreme
Court's antitrust endeavor of the past few decades (which apparently has been to render antitrust a scholastically metaphysical, a priori theoretical exercise) has been its repeated view that,
"[by] a consensus among commentators[,] . . . predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful."4
While no doubt some people still agree with that claim, it turns
out that there was not actually that much of a consensus even
when the Court first said so in MatsushitaElectric IndustrialCo. v.
Zenith Radio Corp. in 1986.' That was clear enough from the
Court's brief string cite for it, 6 which centered mainly on one
thirty-year-old, much discussed article that was surrounded by
disagreement long before Matsushita.7 But in the twenty years
2

Peter Long, Possibility and Actuality, 70 MIND 187, 187 (1961) (quoting GoTr-

FRIED WILLHELM VON LEIBNIZ, Relections on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas, in SELECTIONS 287, 287-88 (Philip P. Wiener ed., 1951)).
3 2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS BK. VI, 41 (E. Capps

et al. eds., R.D. Hicks trans., Loeb Classical Lib. 1925) (ca. 200 C.E.)
(paraphrasing).
4 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1986).
5 Id. at 589-90.
6 Id. The "consensus" the Court identified totaled all of six men, fully half of
whom were central figures in the Chicago tradition. It also seems relevant that
the fourth was a just-freshly degreed, assistant professor of economics at BYU,
and the paper cited-while it has been cited many times since Matsushita-was a
report, in a then-obscure journal, of empirical results from his dissertation. See
id. (citing Roland H. Koller, II, The Myth of PredatoryPricing:An EmpiricalStudy, 4
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971)). Those results also happen to have been
subjected to a test of replicability, and they failed it. That fact was reported in a
paper published in an eminent journal well before Matsushita was decided. The
paper has never been mentioned by the Court. See generally Richard Zerbe &
Donald Cooper, An Empirical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 655 (1982) (reanalyzing Prof. Koller's data).
7 The paper was John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.)
Case, I J. L. & ECON. 137 (1958). As early as 1976 Richard Posner observed in a
widely read book that McGee's influence had been "excessive[ ]," and argued
that predation could sometimes be rational. RiCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 185-87 (1976). Other pre-Matsushitaliterature ques-
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since then, such consensus as ever there was fell apart pretty
rapidly. By the mid-1990s, at just about the time that the Court
would make predation virtually impossible to prove in litigation,
a fairly immense theoretical literature had grown up running
contrary to the Court's view,' and there was growing empirical
evidence as well. 9 Still, none of that has stopped the Court from
tioning McGee's findings was voluminous. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. A certain delicious and gossipy history lurks behind the Court's stringcite. Though Matsushitawas written by Justice Powell, a strong antitrust skeptic, it
so happened that Thurgood Marshall (of all people) employed a clerk that year
who is now law professor Paul Mahoney of the University of Virginia. Mahoney
apparently persuaded Marshall to join the majority by drafting a bench memo
laying out the theory as stated in what would become the majority opinion. (Marshall's was the deciding vote.). See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in the O'ConnorRehnquist Era: A View From Inside the Supreme Court, ANTITRUST, Summer, 2006, at
21, 24 & n.51. Rumor has it that as a student at Yale law school Mahoney was
influenced in such matters by George Priest. In other words, the "consensus"
that mattered may have been in some real sense actually George Priest and a law
student.
8 As Zerbe and Mumford put it, "[a]t one time predation existed as a legal
concept but was discounted as an economic possibility .... Now predation may
be said to exist economically, but ... not to exist legally." Richard 0. Zerbe &
Michael T. Mumford, Does Predatory PricingExist? Economic Theory and the Courts
After Brooke Group, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 949, 951 (1996). See also Bruce H.
Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of PredatoryPricing,in ANTITRUST LAw AND EcoNOMICS (Keith N. Hylton, ed. 2009) (summarizing changing consensus); Louis

Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2

HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

1073,

1195-1202 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds. 2007) (same); Patrick Bolton,Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, PredatoryPricing:Strategic Theory and
Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241-49 (2000) (same); Einer Elhauge, Why AboveCost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory-andthe Implicationsfor Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L. J. 681, 685 (2003) (admitting that by the
early 1990s the kind of theoretical confidence expressed in Matsushita had given
way to substantial doubts, because predation skeptics had "never provided a satisfactory theoretical response to the critics nor addressed practical objections to
actual industry behavior"); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and
Economics of Predatory Pricing,83 AM. ECON. REv. PAP. & PROC. 162, 162 (1993)
(summarizing changing consensus); Charles E. Koob, Whither Predatory Pricing?
The Divergence Between Judicial Decisions and Economic Theory: The American Airlines
and Virgin Atlantic Airways Cases, 3 SEDONA CONF. J. 9, 9 (2002) (same).
9 Some well known empirical evidence even predated Matsushita. B.S. Yamey,
Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15J. L. & ECON. 129, 136 (1972) (discussing evidence of predation in ocean shipping cartels); Richard Zerbe, The
American Sugar Refinery Company, 1887-1914: The Story of a Monopoly, 12 J. L. &
ECON. 339 (1969). Also, at just about the time of the Matsushita decision, there
was the beginning of what would become an econometric literature on predation, though it was probably not available to the Court. Matsushitawas decided in
March of 1986, and the April 1986 issue of Journal of PoliticalEconomy reported
statistically significant evidence consistent with predation. Malcom R. Burns,
PredatoryPricingand the Acquisition Cost of Competitors,94J. POL. ECON. 266, 266-67
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repeating the initial claim verbatim. It has done so no fewer
0 and as recently as early
than four times since Matsushita,"
12
2007.11 The lower courts do it frequently as well.
Because of the Court's view, predation claims are now largely
impossible for plaintiffs to win. The familiar Brooke Group, Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. standard requires both: (1)
that the defendant sold at a loss, and (2) that it is likely to recover its losses by price gouging after its victim exits the market. 3 Plaintiffs now almost always lose on one or both of these
elements. Of the many scores of cases involving predation
claims since Matsushita,4 the number enjoying even minimal
courtroom success is vanishingly small. The number not summarily dismissing predation claims early in the proceedings,
over about twenty years, appears to be on the order of about
nine or ten, and none have prevailed on the merits. 5
(1986) (finding evidence that alleged predation reduced the cost of acquisitions
by incumbent firms in the turn-of-the-century tobacco industry). In any case,
since that time, the econometric and other empirical evidence of predation has
grown substantially. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
10 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312,
323 (2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 226 (1993); Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 343 n.5 (1987); Cargill, Inc.
v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 n.17 (1986). See also Pac. Bell Tel. Co.
v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 (2009) (not restating the
Court's view of the "consensus," citing uncritically prior caselaw that did so, and
repeating same skepticism of predation).
11 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 323.
12 See, e.g., NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 458 (6th Cir. 2007); Virgin
Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways, PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir. 2001);
WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Taylor Publ'g Co. v.
Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 477 (5th Cir. 2000); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v.
FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
84 F.3d 1452, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d
1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995); Bathke v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 343
(8th Cir. 1995); Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993);
Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342
(4th Cir. 1992).
13 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993).
14 See, e.g., U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 989 (lth
Cir. 1993) (reversing denial of judgment as a matter of law following verdict for
plaintiff); Vollrath, 9 F.3d at 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming judgment as a matter
of law following verdict for plaintiff).
15 In connection with this article, the author reviewed all reported federal district and appellate court opinions since Matsushita that address a predation claim
on the merits. The author identified 123 appellate and 191 district court opinions. Almost all the appellate opinions, including claims for other than explicit
price predation, like bundling and volume discounting, affirm summary pre-trial
dispositions for defendant. Trial and appellate courts also override juries surpris-
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The Court has made a mistake. The theoretical and empirical
literature now suggests that predation is possible, can be rational from the predator's perspective, and might be quite
harmful socially. If there is any consensus on the matter, it is
probably only something like this: predation is a kind of conduct that characterizes change between equilibria, but the static
welfare analysis that informs almost all of our antitrust-including that underlying the Brooke Group standard-does not capture
it very well.
This line of thinking sometimes seems borne out when one
looks in detail into an industry where predation claims have
been made. The major point in this article is that the Court's
view will sound pretty surprising to anyone who has paid attention to one of those industries, in particular, the deregulated
airlines. During the industry restructuring that began almost
immediately after deregulation, predation, by fairly common
consensus, has been a tool to make new entry difficult and to
protect pockets of market power, despite the generally high operating costs of incumbent firms. And yet, prevailing doctrine
has made it all but impossible to prove airline predation, and all
but one of the airline cases to have made its way through the
federal courts have failed outright. 6 Moreover, it seems fairly
critical to revisit the airline evidence, because it played a central
role in an important recent article by Einer Elhauge.17 That paper, which in many ways is really quite odd, consists mainly of a
profusion of well-worn a priori arguments. And yet, it has had
arguably quite bad consequences already: it played a key role in
killing off one of the best and most important predation cases in
recent times, a case that happened to involve the airlines.18
The study here is more or less a derivative, but essential, kind
of empiricism. It examines all of the available evidence suringly often in predation cases, and when they do, it is always for defendant's
benefit. Brooke Group itself is not just an example, but a fairly jarring one: it appears to have been the only antitrust case in history in which the Court has reversed a verdict on the sufficiency of the evidence. See 509 U.S. at 219 (affirming
judgment as matter of law following verdict for plaintiff). See also, e.g., U.S.
Anchor, 7 F.3d at 989 (reversing denial of judgment as matter of law following
verdict for plaintiff); Vollrath, 9 F.3d at 1457 (affirming judgment as matter of law
following verdict for plaintiff).
16 In the one exception, Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d
917 (6th Cir. 2005), the parties settled confidentially following reversal of summary judgment for defendant. The case never reached litigation on the merits.
17 See generally Elhauge, supra note 8.
18 See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1118 n.13 (10th Cir. 2003).
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rounding airline predation and asks whether it is more consistent with some model of predation or with the
uncompromisingly general, a priori skepticism on which the
Court has made airline predation probably legally impregnable.
The study answers a call commonly made in the predation literature: it is thought that our understanding of predation, and
dominant firm behavior generally, will be improved especially
by industry-specific case study.19
In some respects, the airlines make a very good case study,
and I am hardly the first to notice. For one thing, there seems
to be about as good a case that it occurs in the deregulated airlines as in any market that there could be. Airline competitors
have alleged predation incessantly;2" most outside observers
seem to believe it occurs in airline markets; 21 it has been investigated repeatedly by the U.S. government 22 and by foreign

19Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, PredatoryPricing: CompetingEconomic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738, 740 (1981);
Richard Craswell & Mark R. Fratrik, Predatory Pricing Theory Applied: The Case of
Supermarkets v. Warehouse Stores, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985); Richard
Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 994 (1979).
20 See infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Aviation Competition Hearing:Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, S. Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 105th Cong. 1067 (1998) (statement of
Alfred Kahn) ("[an] incumbent airline [that] is deliberately accepting financial
losses selectively in the markets where it is subject to competitive challenge[ ] [is]
engaging in . . . discriminatory sharp-shooting" and is engaged in predation);
Stephan P. Brady & William A. Cunningham, Exploring PredatoryPricingin the Airline Industry, TRANsP. J., Fall 2001, at 5 (supporting the Transportation Department's decision to challenge even above-cost schemes; noting that "it can be
argued that predatory pricing schemes have been far more successful than conventional wisdom supports"); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing,
111 YALE L.J. 941, 942-43 (2002); Elhauge, supra note 8, at 685-86 & n.14 (noting observers' special concern for airline predation); Rodney E. Slater, How Antitrust Failed in America: The Sad Case of Predatory Pricing in the U.S. Airline Industry
(IV), 33 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 61, 61-62 (2006); James L. Robenalt, Note,
Predatory Pricingin the Low-Fare Airline Market: Targeted, Discriminatory, and Achieved
With Impunity, 68 OHIo ST. L.J. 641, 642-46 (2007).
22 See generally OFFICE or THE SECRETARY, DEPT. OF TRANSP., ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE ECONOMIC, POLICY, AND LEGAL ISSUES
(2001); OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPT. OF TRANSP., STATEMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT (1998). As part of its

investigation, DOT commissioned a substantial investigation of it by two economists. See generally CLINTON V. OSTER, JR. & JOHN S. STRONG, PREDATORY PRACTICES IN THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY (2001).
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ones; 23 and, most importantly, it has been the subject of a flood
of empirical analysis. Some of that empirical work has found
evidence of actual predation, 24 and a large proportion of it finds
evidence of market power or other factors lending predation
plausibility. 25 Also important is that the empirical literature has
now ripened to an advanced state of theoretical maturity, such
that the early tests finding very substantial market power abuses
have been tested and retested under increasingly sophisticated
controls. Despite those many refinements, empirical study continues to find some persistent market power in the hands of incumbent carriers at their hub airports, most of them legacy
carriers that have maintained their incumbency since deregulation. 26 Airline predation has also engendered a fair bit of litigation and a number of published appellate opinions.2 7
For another thing, the fact that predation is effectively impossible to prove might, in the case of the airlines, produce a tellingly bad policy consequence. Predation is alleged almost
exclusively against the major airlines,2 8 which have remained
higher-cost than the entrants that are ordinarily their alleged
victims. So, in this case, Brooke Group might facilitate the most
perverse of all outcomes within the neoclassical framework: the
preservation of less efficient sellers and suppression (ordinarily
leading to liquidation or cheap acquisition) of more efficient
challengers.
Incidentally, this remains a good case study despite the seeming awkwardness of its timing. Admittedly, the industry just now

23 In recent years charges of price predation have been brought against air
carriers by the competition authorities of Australia, see Australian Competition
and Consumer Comm'n v. Qantas Airways Ltd, 2003 F.C.A. 125, 9-11; Canada,
see Commissioner of Competition v. Air Canada, [2003] 26 C.P.R. (4th) 476, 1
(Can.); and Germany, see Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office] Feb. 18, 2002
9 Beschlussabteilung 144/01 (F.R.G.).
24 See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
25

Id.

See infra notes 116-125 and accompanying text.
See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir.
2005); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2003); Virgin
Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways, Plc, 257 F.3d 256, 259 (2d Cir. 2001); Cont'l
Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 692-93 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
28 "Major" airline is a term of art among transportation lawyers; the Department of Transportation classifies airlines as "major" that have annual revenues in
excess of $1 billion. In this article the term will be used in a looser sense to mean
very large carriers operating hub-and-spoke networks.
26
27
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happens to be on very hard times, 29 and so it may seem odd to
accuse it of behavior designed to earn monopoly status. But, as
this article explains, this industry's poor performance turns out
3
to be a singularly poor economic metric. 1
I.

LAW AND THEORY AS THEY STAND
A.

THE LAW

The test under which all antitrust plaintiffs must now prove
price predation, first crystallized in Matsushita3 and then more
clearly codified in Brooke Group,321 requires proof both that a defendant sold a product below some "appropriate measure of...
cost[ ]" and that it had some serious chance of "recouping its
investment in below-cost prices. '33 Still of academic debate is
which measure of cost should be used, but every federal circuit
has adopted some variation of a short-run price-cost test approximating the famous Areeda-Turner formulation, usually establishing presumptions concerning prices below average variable
or between average variable and average total cost.34 Evidence

of predatory intent, which once was thought possibly sufficient
on its own to prove predation,35 is now: (1) insufficient in itself,
29 Specifically, the major carriers, for some time, have suffered consistent, significant financial losses, which promise to worsen with the continuing crisis in
fuel prices and the drop-off in business travel associated with the current recession. See Ann Keeton, Air Industry Faces Grim Year Ahead, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2009, at B3; Heard on the Street, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2009, at BlO (noting the
continuing difficulty of air carriers coping with fuel costs and their often unsuccessful efforts to control fuel price risks with hedging strategies).
30 See infra Part III.B.

31Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86
(1986).
32 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
222-24 (1993).
33 Id. at 222, 224.

34See Michael L. Denger & John A. Herfort, Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke
Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 541, 548-51 (1994). See also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOWENKAMP, ANTIRUST LAw

723d (summarizing caselaw as of 2002); Rus-

sell A. Klingaman, Predatory Pricing and Other Exclusionary Conduct in the Airline
Industry: Is Antitrust Law the Solution?, 4 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 281, 299-302 (1992)
(summarizing case law).
35 A leading, but frequently criticized precedent predating Brooke Group and
Matsushita, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), was
traditionally taken as strong authority for the importance of intent evidence.
Though technically Brook Group left it undisturbed, Utah Pie was overturned to
whatever extent it held that proof of predatory intent alone could establish actionable predation.

supra note 34, at

See 509 U.S. at 220-23. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,

728.
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(2) legally irrelevant in at least one circuit,36 and (3) significant
in other circuits only where the courts have adopted presump37
tions requiring evidence in addition to pricing below CoSt.
This will be true even in those frequent cases when a plaintiff
adduces direct evidence of deliberate intent to sell below cost
with predatory motives.3 s
Finally, an important practical point not often considered by
courts and predation skeptics, is that predation cannot be illegal
unless a plaintiff can prove either horizontal predation conspiracy or a very substantial amount of market power. The former,
under the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly pleading standard 9 and
the strong skepticism of predation conspiracy in Matsushita,40 is
probably impossible to prove without direct, smoking-gun evidence; and, as is now well-known, proof of the latter is very, very
difficult.4" So, it will be the rare plaintiff that can prove either
horizontal price-fixing conspiracy under Twombly or the market
power showing required under Sherman Act § 2 or the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), as well as standing, antitrust injury, and
the various other showings plaintiffs must meet. But even if a
plaintiff can do all of that, it must then meet the extremely challenging substantive test under Brooke Group.
B.

THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS

The case against predation remains almost exclusively theoretical. It rests heavily on John McGee's seminal paper,42 which
See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402
(7th Cir. 1989).
37 See Denger & Herfort, supra note 34, at 549-50.
38 Several courts have held that such evidence is to be discounted and cannot
alone prove predation. See, e.g., Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1359 (8th Cir.
1989).
39 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007) (requiring allegations of § 1 conspiracy, even at
the pleadings stage, to be "plausible," apparently meaning that conduct alleged
must be economically rational).
40 See 475 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1986) (arguing that all the reasons suggesting the
irrationality of predation generally are compounded in the case of predatory conspiracy, because the ordinary incentive to cheat from cartel pricing is even
stronger where the cartel price is below members' costs).
41 Cf Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association, Not a Quick Look But Not
the FullMonty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521 (2000) (stating author's view, as former
FTC General Counsel, that "when the full, formal rule of reason is the governing
standard, plaintiffs almost never win."); Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REv. 1265, 1267-68 (showing empirically
that full-blown rule of reason cases almost never reach questions beyond market
power).
42 See generally McGee, supra note 7.
36
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is said to have been "empirical" insofar as he reviewed extant
historical evidence about the Standard Oil monopoly. Its empirical findings are now in substantial doubt.4 3 But in any event,

the paper's influence has followed almost exclusively from its
theoretical underpinnings.

incumbents nor

entrants45

44

Its major thrust was that neither

should ever find a below-cost price

43 Tellingly, McGee argued that his introductory "examination of the logic of
predatory price discrimination" would "help[ ] in interpreting the facts." McGee,
supra note 7, at 138. Among other things, later critics took him to task for allowing these theoretical pre-commitments to guide his "empirical" analysis
(which consisted of reading a trial transcript and some other courtroom evidence, and offering his subjective opinion of them), leading him to exaggerate
some points and neglect others. But he made other mistakes too, including some
of a simple clerical variety. For criticism, seeJanusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner,
Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537, 545 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig, eds. 1989) ("There is
little doubt, [notwithstanding McGee's arguments] ... that Standard Oil at least
attempted to use pricing as a weapon to drive its rivals out.");James A. Dalton &
Louis Esposito, Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the
Trial Record, 22 RES. L. & ECON. 155, 157-58 (2007) (offering a variety of criticisms, and finding substantial evidence in the Standard Oil record consistent with
predation); Nicola Giocoli, When Low Is No Good: PredatoryPricingand the History of
Antitrust Economics (PartI), 11-20 (2009) (Dept. of Econ., Univ. of Pisa, Working
Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1412
808 (criticizing McGee's reasoning and findings); Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin
Klein, Monopolization by "RaisingRivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case, 39 J. L. &
ECON. 1, 23 (1996) (arguing that the evidence McGee considered would be consistent with a raising-rivals'-costs exclusionary strategy).
44 Most critics of enforcement against predation follow McGee in resting on
the a priori view that predation should ordinarily be irrational, will ordinarily be
very hard to distinguish from legitimate price competition, and will impose no
social harm unless recoupment succeeds. Two prominent exponents of McGee's
views have argued that price-cutting should be per se legal. See ROBERT BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 149-55 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, PredatoryStrategies
and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 268 (1981). While most others are
somewhat less confident, they too remain almost exclusively a priori. See, e.g.,
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 1 720-23; POSNER, supra note 7, at
191-93; Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case,
77 YALE L.J. 70, 77, 83 (1967); Elhauge, supra note 8, at 688-89; Lester G. Telser,
Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. L. & ECON. 259, 259-60 (1966); cf
James C. Miller, III & Paul Pautler, Predation:The Changing View in Economics and
the Law, 28J. L. & ECON. 495, 495-96 (1985) (stating views of Reagan-era FTC
Chair concerning predation, consisting of purely theoretical Chicago
arguments).
45 Theoretical arguments about predation are normally framed in terms of incumbents with some market power underselling entrants or smaller rivals. This is
so, for the simple reason that without the prospect of preserving or enhancing
some supracompetitive profits, the losses of below-cost pricing would never be
rational. See Oliver E. Williamson, PredatoryPricing:A Strategic and Welfare Analysis,
87 YALE L.J. 284, 292 & n.25 (1977).
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war more profitable than they would find it just to merge, and
that in any event predation should always be a very costly and
risky strategy for incumbents."6
During the decade or so after McGee's article appeared, there
developed a small literature suggesting theoretical grounds to
believe predation might be more likely than he thought and, in
some cases, suggesting empirical evidence of it from other historical case studies. 47 But the first really massive round of discussion was triggered by Areeda and Turner's famous article of
1975.48 Much of that literature implied that predation was more
likely and more dangerous than Areeda-Turner or conservative
perspectives would suggest. Most of it, however, did not doubt
that some variation of some (usually short-term) price-cost comparison should remain the basis of predation doctrine, and argued merely that the Areeda-Turner doctrinal formulation
would be underinclusive."9 By the early 1980s, an importantly
different second generation of criticism had developed, which
found explanations for predation more subtle than the traditional "long purse" strategy that the neoclassical literature assumed to be its only possible rationale. Namely, employing
mostly game theoretic approaches, economists and some lawyers
came to suggest that predation might be rational in a context of
ongoing interaction among firms, especially under conditions of
imperfect or asymmetrical information. 51 So far, this secondgeneration literature has been received with persistent deafness
by most of the federal judiciary.5 "
46
47

McGee, supra note 7, at 139-41.
See generally DONALD DEWEY, THE THEORY

cAL RECONSTRUCTION

OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION:

A RADI-

(1969); Yamey, supra note 9; Zerbe, supra note 9.

48 See generally Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricingand Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975).
49 See generally Brodley & Hay, supra note 19; William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing,89 YALE L.J. 1
(1979); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory
Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); F.M. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory
Pricing,89 HARV. L. REv. 901 (1976).
50 See generallyJonathan Baker, Predatory PricingAfter Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective,62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994); Bolton et al., supra note 8, at 2262; Tom
Campbell & Nirit Sandman, A New Test for Predation: Targeting, 52 UCLA L. REv.
365 (2005); Edlin, supra note 21; William Comanor & H.E. Frech, III, Predatory

Pricingand the Meaning of Intent, 38

ANTITRUST BULL.

293 (1993).

See Baker, supra note 50, at 592. But see Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines,
Inc, 431 F.3d 917, 936 (6th Cir. 2005). The AMR court, in dicta, also acknowledged what it called "Post-Chicago" work on predation and wrote that, in light of
that scholarship, the court would "approach[ ] the matter with caution .... [but
51
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As it now stands, the very large theoretical literature can be
conceived as existing in two rough categories.52 Among those
who favor some liability for some kinds of predation,53 proposals
almost always take the form of either (1) a cost-based doctrinal
test for distinguishing procompetitive from predatory pricing,
or (2) some dynamic test that examines an incumbent's behavior following entry, over time.5 4 Cost-based proposals begin with
the claim that selling goods for less than it costs to make them is
irrational unless there is some longer-term gain to be achieved
from it. Cost tests therefore seem to fit nicely with antitrust law's
general definition of anticompetitive exclusion-conduct that
would be irrational but for the prospect of supracompetitive returns following injury to rivals.55 The problem has been to say
when a price is actually below "cost." Theorists have tried average total

CoSt, 56

average variable cost, 57 marginal cost,5 8 and

not] with the incredulity that once prevailed." United States v. AMR Corp., 335
F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2003).
52 This discussion essentially follows a taxonomy nicely elaborated in Craswell
& Fratrik, supra note 19, at 4-6.
53 There are those who would prefer a rule of per se legality for all alleged
predation. See supra note 44.
54 There are some exceptions, which do not easily fit in either of these categories. F.M. Scherer, for example, urged what would in effect be a full-blown rule
of reason for predatory pricing, under which a court would examine all relevant
factors that bear on the long-run efficiency of an alleged predator's pricing. See
F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV.
869, 890 (1976).
55 This standard was most clearly elaborated in Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.
Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:Pricingand Product Innovation, 91 YALE
LJ. 8, 9 (1981), and is roughly encapsulated in the courts' requirement that monopoly power be acquired by something other than by "superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
71 (1966). Strictly speaking, there are a few ambiguities in the courts' usual application of the test, and they are relevant. Ordover and Willig seemed to intend
a test that would bar any pricing that would fail to maximize profits in the absence of the victim's exit. Courts that have directly considered such an "opportunity cost" or profit maximization test have rejected it; see AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at
1118-19, 1119 n.13 (10th Cir. 2003), and ordinarily the question isjust not even
considered. Likewise, the courts often do not attend to distinctions between
short and long run costs.
56 POSNER, supra note 7, at 188-96.
57 Areeda & Turner, supra note 48, at 732-33.
58 Areeda and Turner famously argued that short-run marginal cost is the theoretically correct measure of predation, because below that price sales are at actual loss and their rational explanation is likely the desire to injure rivals. Id. at
712.
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combinations of costs with other factors. 59 But all such definitions have turned out either to be fraught with risk of over- or
under-inclusion or to require numerous exceptions for special
cases.6" Moreover, cost-based tests are criticized for failure to
consider possibly serious risks of predatory behavior that may
61
not require sales at an outright lOSS.
Dynamic models of predation, on the other hand, mostly eschew any focus on static price-cost comparisons and attempt instead to constrain strategic behavior over time, to allow some
breathing room for procompetitive entry. As had been noticed
even before the game theoretic revolution in industrial organization during the 1980s and 1990s, predation is an intertemporal problem possibly well-suited to the hunt for strategic
advantage.6 2 Because strategic competition over time is characteristic of change between equilibria, it may be only poorly captured in the traditional static analysis mostly used in antitrust.
Static theory is best suited to explaining existing equilibria. For
this reason, dynamic approaches have proposed rules that limit
price or output response to entry for periods of time, rather
63
than ask whether specific prices seemed predatory.
5q Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 49, at 258-59 (urging a rule under which
court would first ask whether a given market's structure, in terms of concentration and entry protection, could support predation, and only then would the
court make a price-cost comparison); Ordover & Willig, supra note 55, at 10-13
(similarly urging a "market structure" inquiry, following which, if structure is
found to be conducive to predation, court asks whether incumbent's price response would maximize profit only if target exits).
60 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 8, at 703-26 (describing the many logic
problems posed by the various cost tests).
61 See, e.g., Edlin, supra note 21, at 955-60 (arguing that without legal constraints on above-cost predation, monopolists plausibly deter procompetitive entry and free monopolists from pressures that might encourage procompetitive,
pre-entry limit pricing); see also Elhauge, supra note 8, at 686 (while ultimately
disagreeing, acknowledging that above-cost predation had become "a serious
concern that can no longer be suppressed with conclusory labels or contestable
claims that ignore the effect on incentives to enter.").
62 Williamson, supra note 45, at 284 (arguing that "predatory pricing involves
strategic behavior in which intertemporal considerations are central," and generally critiquing the use of static welfare analysis to understand it); cf POSNER, supra
note 7, at 185-86 (though not adopting a dynamic doctrinal standard, noting
that otherwise money-losing predation might be rational if the signal it sends
deters entry that otherwise would have occurred).
63 See generally Baumol, supra note 49 (urging a rule under which reactive price
cuts following entry be made permanent for a time, or face antitrust liability);
Edlin, supranote 21 (advocating the rule that where an entrant is able to enter a
monopoly market at 20% or more below the incumbent's price, the incumbent's
price should be frozen for 12 to 18 months); Williamson, supra note 45 (advocat-
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Two specific theoretical problems that run through this literature have special relevance here. First, predation theory has
long been dominated by the simple idea that the law should not
constrain any allegedly predatory conduct unless it could exclude equally efficient entrants. That seems simple enough, because, after all, unless the entrant can meet or beat the
incumbent's minimum above-cost price, the entrant will be
driven out by the very price competition that it is the purpose of
antitrust to protect.
This argument is also likely false. Even less-efficient entry is
needed and healthy for two reasons. First, the presence of an
existing fringe of small competitors or the risk of potential entry
can constrain a dominant firm's pricing, even if those smaller
competitors are higher cost.6 4 But it is quite plausible that an
incumbent can exclude them through short-term price reductions, and if it can make widely known and credible threats of
such exclusionary pricing, it may never even have to engage in
it. In other words, the limit pricing that may be the most competitive result feasible in many markets will not occur if an incumbent firm with some cost advantage can credibly exclude
competitors despite persistent pricing above the limit.65
But maybe more importantly, there is substantial reason to
believe that less efficient entry could become equally efficient if
allowed to establish a market toehold and survive initial price
and output response. Even Elhauge, who vehemently objects to
any protection of less efficient entry, admits that this prospect
"has some basis, "66 though he then argues that it is logically impossible. In fact, it seems that less-efficient entry with prospects
for improved performance should actually be fairly common.
Entry at minimum efficient scale at costs equal to those of an
incumbent-the only kind of entry Elhauge and most cost-theorists would protect from predation-seems like an out-of-the-ordinary occurrence in many ordinary markets. Few entrants will
be able to match an incumbent's efficiency at the point of entry
or even for some comparatively long period thereafter. Virtually
by definition, the incumbent will be better established technologically and its cost functions will not change much over time
ing the rule that an incumbent dominant firm or collusive oligopoly not be permitted to expand beyond pre-entry output for a period of 12 to 18 months).
64 See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1988).
65 This is very persuasively explained in Edlin, supra note 21, at 955-60.
66 Elhauge, supra note 8, at 778.
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(except over fairly long-term horizons). But in most cases, an
entrant's costs will be subject to change in two ways. First, it is
unlikely to enter at its own minimum efficient scale and will
need some room to compete for volume to reach efficient quantity. Second, the entrant's cost function itself is likely to
change-the curves themselves will move-both because of
learning-by-doing and because of growing access to better capital assets and more productive labor. (The latter change will be
more significant in fields like air transport, where skilled labor is
important.)
The arguments against this possibility have been most recently
and comprehensively elaborated by Elhauge. But to be frank,
these arguments say more by their strikingly bare and unconvincing character than by their substance. Elhauge argues that
the law should not protect less-efficient entry (1) because several
downsides might follow if an entrant can gain efficiency only at
the expense of the incumbent's efficiency, and (2) because, if
the entrant can gain efficiency without harming the incumbent,
then capital markets will realize it and fund whatever price war
may ensue, regardless whether antitrust provides any protection
from predation.
Both arguments are extremely implausible. As to the first,
Elhauge offers very little reason to anticipate the counterintuitive event that entry itself will cause the incumbent to become
less efficient.67 Elementary theory provides that competition increases competitors' productive efficiency,6" and there is theoretical reason to believe that monopoly encourages
organizational slack and at least sometimes deadens innovation.69 Elhauge argues that entrant efficiency would necessarily
come at the expense of incumbent efficiency if in a given market, minimum efficient scale is achieved only at output of more
than half of the market. However, he gives no evidence of the
frequency of such markets or reason to believe they would be
likely, and indeed they would seem fairly rare. As to his other
argument, the view that capital markets will fully fund any entrant with a hope of achieving efficiency amounts to favoring a
legally irrebutable presumption that capital markets are perfectly efficient or nearly so. However, among the oldest arguId. at 778-82.
See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON &JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (3d ed. 2000).
69 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807 (1975).
67

68
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ments in the predation literature is that the purpose of a
predation strategy might be to disrupt access to capital, and it
has now been developed to exceptional theoretical richness."v
A second major theme in the predation literature is relevant
here. A central claim of the game theoretic revolution in predation theory that began in the 1980s has been that predation as
against one entrant or in one local market could establish an
incumbent's reputation for predation. If that reputation deters
entry in other periods or in other local markets, it could render
an otherwise money-losing predatory campaign rational.
Reputational strategies might be effective on the (realistic) assumption that potential entrants and their financiers lack perfect information about the incumbent's actual costs. A nice tool
for legally operationalizing this insight is Williamson's condition
that, other things equal, rules requiring entrants to have greater
knowledge or bear more risk should be disfavored.7
Again, it is in a way the most telling defense of reputationbased arguments that the counterarguments made to them have
been so slim and unpersuasive. Here, Elhauge's argument is
truly striking. Though he claims that reputation theories have
"manifold problems," his strangely overstated effort to discredit
them virtually proves their plausibility in all but a few special
cases.72 In an otherwise immensely comprehensive, 148-page
law review article, he devotes only four strained paragraphs to
the issue, noting a handful of arguments that might conceivably
prove problematic-for example, that some monopolists sell in
only one market (though it is actually a bit unclear why this
would preclude a reputation based strategy) and that it is possible that some entrants could enter all of an incumbent's markets at once (in which case, admittedly, a reputation for
predation might be irrelevant, but that would be the unusual
case and not the norm). He then concludes with a peculiar invocation of the so-called "chain store paradox. ' 73 Even aside
from the fact that the "backward induction" outcome described
70 Telser made a point of it as early as 1966, see Telser, supra note 44, and it has
been developed in a theoretical literature since then. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton &
David S. Scharfstein, A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial
Contracting,80 Am. ECON. REv. 93 (1990); Drew Fudenberg &Jean Tirole, A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation, 17 RANDJ. ECON. 366 (1986).
71 Williamson, supra note 45, at 293.
72 Elhauge, supra note 8, at 722-23.
73 Id. at 723 (citing Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox,9 THEORY & DECISION 127 (1978)).
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in Selten's original paper would depend on perfect information
and stylized, exceptionally unrealistic rules of play-and therefore is a long way from proving anything about actual pricing
4-Elhauge's
and entry in real-world marketsW
use of it here is
really quite odd. Selten's purpose in originally describing the
paradox was to suggest that actual human decision makers probably would not follow theoretically correct strategies in the chain
store scenario (and hence it was a "paradox").7 5 Experimental
evidence now suggests that, at least where information is incom76
plete, his hunch was correct.
74 Selten constructed a game with many periods in which a chain store business operates stores in various towns. The business would face potential entry,
once in each period, by one entrepreneur in each town. If a particular entrepreneur decides to enter, the incumbent would earn a better payoff in that particular period by conciliating-by reducing its output and not cutting price. But it
would earn an even better payoff if the entrepreneurs chose not to enter at all.
Selten thought there should never be any reason for the incumbent to react aggressively through price or output except that by developing a reputation for
such things it might discourage future entry. However, in the very last period the
incumbent would have nothing to gain from a reputation strategy-by definition
there would then be no future periods in which a reputation might discourage
entry. But all the other potential entrants would realize this, too, and therefore
the second-to-last entrant could anticipate that there would be nothing for the
incumbent to gain through aggressive response in the second-to-last period either. And so on, by backward induction all the way to the very first period. By
Selten's reasoning the game theoretically-correct result is a "one shot" resolution
under which all potential entrants enter and the incumbent accommodates all
entry. See Selten, supra note 73, at 131-33. However, this result logically follows
only under Selten's strict and highly unrealistic rules of play. All players have
perfect information and there is only a known and finite number of periods of
play, and a known and finite number of potential entrants. Subsequent theoretical work shows pretty conclusively that this result would not be obtained if any of
a number of more realistic assumptions are added. See generally KAPLOW & SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 1195-96.
75 Selten, supra note 73, at 131-33.
76 To be fair, the experimental results are mixed, only sometimes finding that
entrants can be strongly deterred by the incumbent's reputation for aggression,
and researchers remain unsure just why deviations from backward induction are
observed. But one result that is definitely not borne out in any of the evidence is
behavior consistent with backward induction, particularly where games involve
many periods or lack perfect information. SeeJordi Brandts & Neus Figueras, An
Exploration of Reputation Formation in Experimental Games, 50 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 89 (2003); James Sundali et al., Reputation and Deterrence: Experimental Evidence From the Chain-Store Game, J. Bus. & ECON. STUD., Spring 2000, at 1; Dustin
Tingley & Barbara Walter, Reputation Building in International Relations: An
Experimental Approach (Oct. 30, 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the Journal of Air Law & Commerce); Yun Joo Jung et al., On the Existence of
Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the
Chain-Store Game, 25 RAND J. ECON. 72 (1993).
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C.

THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY OF AIRLINE PREDATION

With all that in mind, a plausible model of airline predation
can be conceived, and it can be compared to empirical evidence
from the industry. Price predation might plausibly be used by
an incumbent airline with market power and some protection
from easy entry or re-entry. Such a strategy would be rendered
more rational if any of several characteristics are present in a
given market: (1) the incumbent can limit the volume of traffic
to which price cuts will be applied; (2) the price cuts as against
one entrant will affect the expectations of potential entrants and
their financiers in other markets (that is, that one successful episode of predation may have reputational consequences); (3) entry by less efficient rivals poses a threat to incumbent profits
because of the risk of substantial increases in entrant cost efficiency; and (4) less-efficient entry that nevertheless poses threats
to incumbent profits can be credibly repelled by profit sacrifice
that is above cost or below cost only on an incremental basis.
The remainder of this article sets out to prove that such evidence as there is (and there is a lot), is more consistent with this
model of incumbent predation than it is with the conception of
predation contained in prevailing antitrust doctrine. The remainder of the paper is thus essentially an empirical account of
the industry's history and the airlines' behavior.
II.

THE INDUSTRY'S PERTINENT HISTORY
A.

HISTORY TO DATE

Domestic aviation was largely the creation of Herbert Hoover's Postmaster General, Walter Folger Brown, who oversaw its
development according to a Hooverian policy of associationalist
industry self-regulation, along with substantial federal assistance
to support the still dangerous and commercially nonviable industry. (Viability would have to wait for the development of
long-range, wide body airplanes several years later)." Of relevance to this article is that Brown used a broad statutory discretion to award federal mail contracts-on which the industry was
then dependent for its very life-and used that discretion to
force the existing major carriers to divide the country's available
passenger traffic among themselves (along a handful of major
See generally T. A. HEPPENHEIMER, TURBULENT SKIES: THE HISTORY OF COM(1995); Richard H. K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Airline Regulation and Deregulation, 1925-1988, 64 Bus. HIST. REv. 61 (1990).
77

MERCIAL AVIATION
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transnational routes on which they would not compete with one
another). That division, agreed to in secret among Brown and
airline executives, would form the rudimentary basis of the industry's infrastructure until deregulation. Brown's meetings
with the airlines, which later came to scandalous light in legislative hearings managed by Senator Hugo Black, came to be
known as the "spoils conference. '"78 There ensued a political
backlash that led both to the creation of the Civil Aeronautics
Board's (CAB) first predecessor in 1938 and to the diminution
of federal subsidy. However, even as direct subsidy tapered off,
the industry came to depend on a completely different kind of
subsidy under CAB oversight. When it emerged from regulation
in 1978, the industry was about fifty years old, but had never
lived without either direct federal subsidy or the substantial aid
of the CAB's policy of supporting all certificated carriers at profitable levels.7 1 Under regulation, the industry was never especially profitable, but also never suffered persistent, systematic
losses.
The industry's life since deregulation has been quite different. That thirty-year period can be seen in three roughly decade-long blocks. From deregulation until about 1985, aggressive
competition prevailed, characterized initially by a barrage of
new entry and fare competition by both entrants and the large
incumbents, along with the industry reorganization one might
expect from a transition to unregulated competition. Reorganization included acquisitions by the majors of significant regional
carriers to serve as feeders,8 0 as well as acquisition of many
smaller entrants and the liquidation of a few of the large carriers. s" Indeed, it was during this period that the Department of
Transportation (DOT), during its short tenure as successor to
the CAB's airline merger review authority, approved all of the
twenty-one mergers submitted for its review. 2
See HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 77; Vietor, supra note 77.
See HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 77; Vietor, supra note 77; Peter C. Carstensen,
Evaluating "Deregulation"of Commercial Air Travel: False Dichotomization, Untenable
Theories, and Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 111 (1989).
80 This was notably the case of TWA's acquisition of Ozark and Northwest's
acquisition of Republic.
81 Braniff failed not long after deregulation, and it was roughly during this
period that Pan Am, Eastern, and TWA also failed. (Notably, TWA was acquired
in bankruptcy by American Airlines, with the effect that American retains dominance in St. Louis).
82 See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & ANDREW R. GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND
78

79
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This period produced deregulation's most unambiguous benefits, consisting mainly in savings from fare competition and increased travel. Fares declined significantly in real dollars and
ridership increased. 3 Consumer savings may have been as
much as $6 billion per year by the mid-to-late 1980s, s4 and the
absence of such consumer savings prior to deregulation may
have represented a loss of as much as $1 billion per year. 5 That
consequence had been foreseen by deregulators, but given their
expectation of "contestability" in airline markets, certain other
developments were quite surprising.8 a First, this was also the
time during which competitive pressures encouraged the industry's current hub-and-spoke infrastructureS 7-one of the truly
spectacular and unpredicted consequences of deregulation, and
a change that had both economic benefits88 and costs that are
important in this article. Another major surprise of this period
was the development of the sophisticated price discrimination
approach known as "yield management," which also has relevance to predation. 89 In any case, this initial, exuberant period
ended to some large extent with the initial consolidation of the
81 See Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, How Airline Markets Work... Or Do
They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry 12-13 & figs. 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13452, 2007) (reporting that between 1976
and 1986 average revenue fell by 3.4% per year and passenger-miles increased by
8.2% per year; Borenstein & Rose also compare actual fares to what fares likely
would have been if the CAB were still fixing minimum rates according to its "standard industry fare level" formulation and find that actual fares are substantially
lower).
84 See STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 31-33 (1986).
85 See id. at 5, n.2 (collecting and summarizing pre-deregulation evidence).
86 See GloriaJ. Hurdle et al., Concentration,PotentialEntry, and Performance in the
Airline Industry, 38 J. INDUS. ECON. 119, 119-20 (1989) (a Justice Departmentfunded study by five economists); Thomas Gale Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation:
Its Effects on Passengers, Capital, and Labor, 29J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1986).
87 See generally MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 84, at 6-10.
88 See Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Intercity TransportationRoute Structures Under Deregulation:Some Assessments Motivated by the Airline Experience, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 57 (1985). Prior to deregulation, consensus had it
that deregulation would lead to significant drops in departure frequency, as theorists failed to predict the huge increase in hub-and-spoke organization. Id. See
also MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 84, at 6-7; Elizabeth Bailey et al., Source of
Economic Rent in the DeregulatedAirline Industry, 31 J.L. & ECON. 173 (1988);Jan K.
Brueckner & Pablo T. Spiller, Economies of Traffic Density in the Deregulated Airline
Industry, 37J.L. & ECON. 379 (1994); Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, An
Econometric Analysis of the Demand for Intercity Passenger Transportation,2 RES. IN
TRANS. ECON. 213 (1985).
89 See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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hubs. By more or less that same time, virtually all of the new
carriers that had entered interstate service since deregulation
either failed outright or were acquired by major carriers (indeed, virtually every genuinely new entrant since deregulation,
in this or any subsequent period, has failed)."
Next, beginning in about 1993, as the economy generally
emerged from downturn and Southwest Airlines began to convincingly demonstrate the possibility of selective, low-cost competition against the majors, another entry flurry ensued. That
period, too, was comparatively short lived. 9 1 During the late
1990s, the majors began to do quite well-in fact, for a time they
earned all-time record profits. Nevertheless, by the end of this
second period, the majors began to suffer again and, predictably, virtually all of the new entrants of this period either failed
outright or were acquired. The end of this period also saw another time of intense efforts to consolidate among the majors,
though the government at that time also imposed its first serious
92
limits on those transactions.
There then ensued what might be thought of as the present
period, one generally characterized by fairly severe financial
malaise among all airlines except Southwest (another new entrant that so far has survived on the low-cost carrier (LCC)
model, JetBlue, has also fared better recently than most airlines). Concentration in airline markets is now as high as it has
ever been, and it seems likely that it will increase if poor economic performance drives further merger and consolidation.
Interestingly, poor cost performance (or at least costs higher
than LCC entrants) has persisted among the largest airlines
even though there is reason to expect substantial returns to
scale and/or scope in air transport, especially as to the carriers'

90 Some non-legacy carriers cannot be characterized as "new" entrants since

deregulation, since they operated prior to 1978 in unregulated status, because
they were only intrastate in character or otherwise not subject to CBA oversight.
Some of these carriers have done better than post-deregulation entrants, the
most significant being Southwest.
91 See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, AIRPORT PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK:
A GLOBAL SURVEY 485 (1999).
92 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of justice, Department Announces Tentative
Settlement in Northwest-Continental Lawsuit, (Nov. 6, 2000); Stephen Labaton,
Airlines and Antitrust: A New World. Or Not., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at Cl;
Laurence Zuckerman, Antitrust Laws an Issue in Airline Alliances, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 2002, at E3.

940

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

information costs.9" It is thought that the majors' higher costs
are largely the result of union contracts, 94 which preserve wages
and work rules developed under regulation and also protect a
relatively senior work force. 5 But there was also a time when
most observers thought that their comparatively high costs and
the continued suffering of the majors would dissipate as they
corrected the inefficient capital structure developed
under reg97
ulation.96 That view has come into doubt.
Predation in the airlines, or concern about it, is at least as old
as deregulation. Opponents of deregulation feared it, and the
government, despite its great initial skepticism that it could occur in airline competition, took action to address it.9" As deregulatory confidence in the expected near-perfect contestability
of airline markets faded, realization set in with government and
industry observers that predation might be real. By the late
1980s, as the hub-and-spoke infrastructure had settled into a certain stability and the majors began to exploit some market
power, many small would-be entrants alleged predation. A similar period followed the burst of new entry during the early to
mid-1990s, when new entrants sent a barrage of formal complaints to the Department of Transportation.99
So, interestingly, while it is often claimed (correctly) that deregulation spurred significant new entry and fare competition, it
is really more accurate to say that in the thirty years since deregulation, there have been two fairly brief, discrete bouts of entry. Both followed industrywide or macroeconomic events that
93 Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and PublicPolicy, 4YALEJ. ON REG. 393, 417 (1987) (summarizing arguments).
94 See Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Airlines Case: A Chance to
Clarify PredationPolicy, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION,
AND POLICY 502, 505 (2001) (John E. KwokaJr. & LawrenceJ. White, eds., 4th ed.,
2004).
95 See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Financial Performance of the Airline
Industry Post-Deregulation,45 Hous. L. REv. 421 (2008).
96 See, e.g., MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 84, at 2.
97 See, e.g., Borenstein & Rose, supranote 83, at 18-19 (observing that the rate
of carrier failure since deregulation "appears to reflect more than transitional
uncertainty in the aftermath of deregulation.").
98 See Robert G. Berger & Stephanie J. Mitchell, Predatory Pricing in the Airline
Industry: A Case Study-The Policies and Practices of the CAB, 13 TRANsp. L.J. 287,
287-88 (1984) (discussing anti-predation policy established by Civil Aeronautics
Board shortly after 1978 deregulation legislation, though also noting the Board's
concern over chilling healthy price competition, and describing Board's standards as almost impossible to meet).
- See OSTER & STRONG, supra note 22, at 10 n.8.
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suggested additional profits might be available (namely, deregulation itself, in the first instance, and the success of Southwest
Airlines and the improving economy of the early 1990s, in the
second). In both cases, flurries of complaints of predation, including some lawsuits challenging it, ensued; and in both cases,
most entrants either failed or were acquired.
B.

THE DEREGULATED AIRLINES' IMPORTANT PECULIARITIES

Airlines are said to display a number of important idiosyncrasies, and it is sometimes said that those "special" features explain
why airline markets can exhibit predation even if others do not.
While ultimately these traits actually do not distinguish the airlines that much with respect to their vulnerability to predation,
the following discussion will be useful for later discussion.
1.

Hubs, Network Effects, and Entry Barriers

The theme dominating the theoretical and empirical literature has been the industry's transition to hub-and-spoke networks, a change that was not predicted during the deregulation
debate. Hubs are competitively significant for several reasons.
As will be explained, they appear to support market power. The
exact reason why is unknown, though it may have to do with the
advantages they pose for local travelers in connection with frequent flyer programs and travel agent loyalty programs.' 00 Second, they present significant positive network externalities for
customers, who have been shown to strongly favor "online" connections that do not require taking different legs of the same
trip on more than one carrier. Finally, they represent among
the more significantly known entry barriers in the industry. If
entry into an already-hubbed market requires establishment of a
competing hub, then entry there will be very difficult. 1° 1
Current evidence suggests that the dominance of hubs is
slowly eroding,0 2 and anecdotal evidence has it that the inconvenience and travel delay associated with connecting flights may
drive an evolution toward greater reliance on point-to-point
100 See Severin Borenstein, Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power,
80 Am. ECON. REv. 400, 400 (1990).
101 See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 94, at 519. See also ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS
FROM DEREGULATION: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH 8-9

(2004).
102 See KAHN, supra note 101, at 5-7.
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structures.'0° For the time being, however-and throughout the
period during which available evidence of predation was compiled-hubs were an absolute force in commercial air travel.
Price Discrimination,Perishability, Ramsey Effects, and RPA
Exemption

2.

Surely, the next most salient market behavior following deregulation has been the carriers' extraordinary amount of price
discrimination. Very shortly after deregulation, the major carriers developed means of very sophisticated inventory management, relying on the information obtained through computer
reservation systems, primarily under the leadership of American
Airlines. The carriers have not denied that their motive was to
ensure that all passengers pay as close as possible to their maximum willingness to pay.' °4
It is sometimes said that, in addition to motives of profit maximization, airlines actually face a strong pressure toward price
discrimination according to buyer elasticities, along with a related susceptibility to price wars associated with large fixed and
small incremental costs. This is so because once a flight is
scheduled, almost all of its costs become essentially invariant,
regardless of how full it is. For this reason, airplane seats are
often called "perishable."
As Peter Carstensen explains, the carriers can discriminate so
well because they are legally free to prohibit transferability of

See Rose M. Rubin &Justin N. Joy, Where Are the Airlines Headed? Implications
of Airline Industry Structure and Change for Consumers, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 215,
224-25 (2005) (citing Joe Sharkey, Major Changes Foreseen in Air Travel, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, at C8).
104 Incidentally, this discrimination itself does not violate the Robinson-Patman
Act (RPA). The RPA generally bars price discrimination in sales to similarly situated buyers. Presumably, discrimination in airline fares, which is carefully tailored to individual demand elasticity with no necessary connection to other
market circumstances, could not satisfy the RPA's cost-based exceptions or the
"meeting competition" defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006). However, the statute applies only to sales of "commodities." While no case appears to consider
whether commercial air travel is a "commodity," courts have broadly held that
"transportation" is not a commodity. See Fleetway, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Interstate
Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761, 763-64 (3d Cir. 1934) (affirming dismissal of a claim
involving passenger buses); Alliance Shippers, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 673 F.
Supp. 1005, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (dismissing a claim involving railroad freight
shipments and holding that "transportation is not a commodity").
103
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tickets, preventing what presumably otherwise would be an arbi0 5
trage market dissipating most or all of the associated profit.1
3.

Scarce Airport Facilities

A second possibly significant entry barrier, especially in the
largest and most congested urban airports, is limitation of airport facilities. Almost all commercial airports remain government owned, and airport operators have been severely criticized
both for failure to support needed expansion and to develop
market-based means for apportioning facilities in pro-competitive fashion (and often airports have been pressured to avoid
any such solutions by major airlines to which they feel beholden). Probably the most competitively significant facilities
problem is a shortage of gates, which have often been tied up in
very long-term leases to locally dominant carriers, though some
for take-off and landing
problems also arise from limited10 "slots"
6
at especially congested airports.

4.

Sunk Costs of Entry

Yet another possibly significant entry barrier is that entry into
a new airline route entails some sunk costs, especially in terms of
advertising and the development of market-specific marketing
information. Fixed investments that are truly "sunk"-not recoverable on exit-are now ordinarily recognized as barriers to
entry or re-entry even if they were also initially incurred by the
incumbent.17

5.

Scale Effects Associated with Information

Michael Levine first observed that there may be significant information costs in deregulated airline markets, and they might
be susceptible to scale and scope economies.108 These costs
arise because airlines must advertise themselves to a large and
disperse body of consumers and must convey important infor105 See Peter C. Carstensen, The PoorFinancialPerformance of Deregulated Airlines:
Competition as Causation or Only Correlation? Reflections on ProfessorDempsey's Article,
45 Hous. L. REv. 487, 503-04 (2008); Alexandra Marks, Major Turbulence Ahead
for Airlines, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, June'26, 2008, http://csmonitor.com/2008/
0 6 2 6 /pO ls06-usgn.htm?print=true.
106 A "slot" is a time of day assigned to a particular carrier dictating when it is
permitted to take off or land an airplane at a given airport.
107 See William Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers,
and the Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405 (1981).
108 See Levine, supra note 93, at 396.
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mation that consumers are ill-suited to judge before they
purchase tickets." °9 Branding is particularly important, says Levine, because airline consumers normally pay before delivery,
and the product happens to be dependent on consumer confidence in reliability and safety. 1 ' Scale is also thought to be important in effective frequent flyer and travel agent loyalty
programs.
6.

Vertical Integration

The major carriers integrate vertically in at least two ways that
are said to have competitive significance: (1) in the distribution
of travel services and (2) in the acquisition of connecting travelers. As for distribution,111 however, what were once significant
competitive concerns may have eased. There was a time when a
chief concern over vertical integration was abuse associated with
airline-owned computer reservation systems (CRS) .112 The
problem engendered a fair bit of antitrust litigation, much of it
successful,1 1 3 and resulted in CAB-era rules to constrain anticompetitive abuses, which were in place for twenty years" 4 until industry changes and the rise of internet distribution had
largely displaced
the power to constrain competition through
1 15
the CRS's.

at 418.
110 Id. at 426-27.
I See Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 976, 979
(Jan. 7, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 CRS Order].
112 All CRS's with U.S. operations were developed and traditionally owned by
domestic carriers. American Airlines pioneered the field with its Sabre system in
the 1950s, ajoint venture with IBM. See HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 77; Robert V.
Head, Getting Saber off the Ground, IEEE ANNALS OF THE HIST. OF COMPUTING,
Oct.-Dec., 2002, at 32, 32-33.
113 See, e.g., In reAir Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694
F. Supp. 1443, 1475-76 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
114 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 255.1-255.8 (2009). The CAB first adopted the rules in
1984 under its statutory power to prevent "unfair methods of competition"
among the airlines. See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed.
Reg. 32,540, 32,541-42 (Aug. 15, 1984) (referencing 49 U.S.C. § 41712, commonly referred to as "Section 411" after its codification in the original Federal
Aviation Act).
115 See 2004 CRS Order, supra note 111, at 977. DOT promised in its order to
use its unfair competition power to control abuses that might arise in the deregulated CRS marketplace. See id. at 977-78. Its assertion ofjurisdiction to do so has
been upheld on judicial review. See Sabre, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See generally Thomas L. Ray, DOT's Authority to Regulate
Airline Sales Through Computer Reservations Systems, AIR & SPACE LAW., Spring 2006,
at 23, 23-24.
109 Id.
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Integration with feeders has also often been noted as a problem, though it seems not especially specific to airlines. Namely,
it appears that majors have acquired regional carriers not only
as a source of needed traffic for hub networks, but also to forestall the growth of would-be entrants.
III.

AIRLINE PREDATION
A.

THE BASIC CASE

Again, the case here is that predation by an incumbent airline
with entry-protected market power is plausible and supported by
the empirical evidence. The case will be strongest if the evidence is consistent with the incumbent's ability to limit the cost
of predation, as through area discrimination and profit sacrifice
that is above cost or below cost only on an incremental basis,
and if there are important reputational effects.
So what does the empirical evidence show? First, structural
factors should strongly facilitate airline predation. One important fact appears to be beyond serious dispute: since deregulation, the surviving major carriers have held pockets of market
power.1 16 Each of the network carriers maintains hub airports
and most of them enjoy some significant market share dominance on at least some routes at their hubs. While certain dramatic results from the early years of deregulation have been
tempered by more sophisticated research," 7 a consistently robust empirical result has been that fares are higher at concenand that mergers increasing
trated hub airports '
Market power or structural factors rendering market power attainable are
thought to be essential to most strategic entry deterrence. In unconcentrated or
highly competitive markets, investments in deterrence would likely be wasted;
rather, competition should be mainly based on price. Empirical evidence bears
out this prediction. See David S. Bunch & Robert Smiley, Who Deters Entry? Evidence on the Use of Strategic Entry Deterrents, 74 REv. ECON. & STAr. 509, 517-20
(1992) (regression study on survey results of industry participants, finding market
concentration strongly positively correlated with the use of a variety of entry deterrence strategies).
117 For comprehensive review of the literature testing airline fares, see Michael
W. Tretheway & Ian S. Kincaid, The Effect of Market Structure on Airline Prices: A
Review of EmpiricalResults, 70J. AIR L. & COM. 467, 469-98 (2005).
118 See Severin Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in
the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 RAND J. ECON. 344, 344 (1989) (a regression analysis
finding that concentrated firms charged elevated prices on routes they dominate;
but, interestingly, also finding that concentration produced no "umbrella" effect
allowing rivals on those routes to elevate fares); Amy D. Abramowitz & Stephen
M. Brown, Market Share and Price Determination in the ContemporaryAirline Industry, 8
REv. INDUS. ORG. 419, 429 (1993); William N. Evans & loannis N. Kessides, Local116
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concentration at hubs are associated with higher fares.'" Market power is further shown by price discrimination by the majors, which theoretically should be ineffective without it; 20 by
evidence of oligopolistic pricing where two or more majors
dominate a particular route; 21 and by the majors' apparent ability to engineer coordinated price increases. 22 Admittedly, the
early evidence of very, very high "hub premiums" has been tempered by subsequent research. It was discovered that a number
of factors other than market power could explain some portion
of the hub premium. These mainly centered around the fact
that hubs are located in larger cities, where price is naturally
increased by the higher concentrations of low-elasticity business
travelers, increased airport congestion, and similar factors, and
the fact that hub carriers ordinarily have well established brand
identities that render all their fares higher than those of smaller
carriers. Hubs also tend to be characterized by a traffic mix in-

ized Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry, 75 REv. ECON. & STAT. 66, 66 (1993);
Margaret A. Peteraf & Randal Reed, Pricing and Performance in Monopoly Airline
Markets, 37J. L. & ECON. 193, 206, 208 (1994) (a regression analysis finding that,
while potential competition had some limiting effect on monopolist airline pricing, both monopoly on given routes and large national market share were associated with higher fares).
119See Borenstein, supra note 100, at 400-01 (a regression analysis finding fare
increases associated with 1986 acquisition by Northwest of Republic); MatthewJ.
Hergott, Airport Concentrationand Market Power: An Events Study Approach, 12 REv.
INDUS. ORG. 793, 798-800 (1997); E. Han Kim & Vijay Singal, Mergers and Market
Power: Evidence From the Airline Industry, 83 Am. ECON. REv. 549, 567 (1993) (a
regression analysis of the flurry of mergers during the mid-1980s; finding merger
led to increased fares).
120 SeeAREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at
721c; OSTER & STRONG, supra
note 22, at 22-23.
121 James A. Brander & Anming Zhang, Market Conduct in the Airline Industry:
An EmpiricalInvestigation, 21 RAND J. ECON. 567, 571, 580 (1990) (a regression
analysis of thirty-three "duopoly" routes to Chicago dominated by United Airlines
and American Airlines finding behavior most consistent with Cournot competition). There is also evidence that when two legacy carriers face ongoing contacts
in multiple city-pairs, they behave oligopolistically as to all of them. See
Tretheway & Kincaid, supra note 117, at 494 (discussing Li Zou et al., Many Fields
of Battle: How Cost Structures Affect Competition Across Multiple Markets, Address at the 2004 Air Transport Research Society World Conference in Istanbul,
Turkey (July 2, 2004)).
122 SeeJonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated
Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 135, 166-67 (2002)
(finding anecdotal evidence of successfully coordinated parallel price increase).
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cluding shorter average distance flights, which are higher
CoSt.123

And yet, despite many years of voluminous and persistently
refined research controlling for this host of other factors possibly explaining hub premiums, researchers still consistently find
a cushion of pricing power at hub airports explained by nothing
else than market power.12 There is reason to expect this pricing power to persist for some time. Domestic airline routes are
more concentrated than they ever have been, and concentration
worsened drastically
following last year's merger of Delta and
25
Northwest.

Other structural factors are also conducive to predation.
First, market power at hubs is enhanced by significant entry barriers. Some of these are governmentally imposed, as governments regulate access to airport facilities. 126 Scale and scope
efficiencies associated with hubbing also represent first mover
advantages that entrants will ordinarily find very hard to
match. 2 7 Southwest has been able to penetrate these barriers,
but other LCCs, by and large, have not.' 28 Loyalty programs are
also thought to represent significant entry barriers, particularly
at hubs. 29 Moreover, entering any given city-pair entails some
significant fixed costs that are sunk. Incumbents enjoy strong
international brand identity and can enhance its effect at hubs
with loyalty programs. Entrant airlines therefore must invest to
establish brand identity and their presence on a given route and
in the information resources necessary to market new route
schedules to consumers for particular routes. All such costs are
sunk. 3 °
123 SeeTretheway & Kincaid, supra note 117, at 474-78, 480-82 (discussing various explanatory variables confirmed by research subsequent to the early hub premium studies).
124 See id. at 475-78 (collecting many such studies).
125 See Diana Moss, The Merger of Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines: An Antitrust White Paper2-3, 5-7 (Am. Antitrust Inst. White Paper, July 10, 2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/AA1White%20Paper_
Delta_NW_071020081922.pdf.
126 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
127 See supra note 101 and accompanying text; Edlin, supra note 21, at 943 &
n.12.
128 See generally RANDALL D. BENNETT &JAMES M. CRAUN, DEPT. OF TRANSP., OFF.

OF AVIATION ANALYSIS, THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION EVOLUTION CONTINUES: THE

(1993).
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

SOUTHWEST EFFECT

12
130
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Second, airlines are legally and practically well suited to a variety of price discrimination strategies, and they are known to
practice them assiduously. They are exempt from the RPA prohibition on discrimination and have developed perhaps the
most sophisticated information technology tools for discrimination of any industry. Specific routes are also highly insulated
from geographic competition-geographic markets for airline
competition are ordinarily defined as specific city-pairs-so airlines are well situated to practice zone pricing to limit predatory
losses."3 '
Third, there is reason to believe that reputation effects are
important in airline markets. While entry on a specific route
need not involve significant capital outlay (unless it requires expansion in the given carrier's capacity by the addition of new
planes), entering service in itself involves a huge capital commitment. New LCCs are therefore heavily dependent on access to
capital, a fact that inherently puts them at some risk of predation. 11 2 Similarly, most airlines experience contact with one another in multiple markets. Developing a reputation for
predation in one market might discourage entry in others,
thereby protecting excess profits in several markets with predatory losses in only one.
So if the structural circumstances are right for predation, is
there evidence that it has occurred? It is widely accepted that
LCC entry in some airline markets draws swift and drastic incumbent price reactions, and the observed patterns of those reactions suggest predatory motives. In several well-documented
accounts, incumbent reactions have been glaring and severe, 33
and there is some direct evidence that they were made at a genuine loss, especially if price-cost comparisons are made on incremental basis.'
Two of the best known instances involve
See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
133 See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir.
2005); OSTER & STRONG, supra note 22, at 7-10; Roger W. Fones, Chief, Transp.
Energy & Agric. Section Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Predation in the
Airline Industry, Speech Before American Bar Association Forum on Air and
Space Law 19 (June 12, 1997).
134 That is, where the comparison is made by asking whether the increase in
revenue associated with the increased output of a predatory strategy (which will
occur almost by definition, since the predator's lower price will increase demand
that the entrant will likely not want or be able to fill) is greater than the increased
costs associated only with that additional output. It will frequently be the case
that capacity responses to entry that are below-cost on this incremental basis will
131

132

2009]

PRICE PREDATION AMONG AIRLINES

949

antitrust litigation, in which courts extensively analyzed internal
cost data suggesting pricing had been predatory. In both cases,
world-renowned economists (including a Nobel laureate and an
economist who is among the world's leading critics of anti-predation policies) opined as experts that price was either below
cost in an absolute sense or represented a seriously anticompetitive profit sacrifice. 115 (Researchers ordinarily have no access to
carriers' internal cost data, so documentation of actual belowcost pricing must ordinarily be found in litigation.)
Econometric evidence has also shown that LCC entry is, in general, associated with very significant fare reductions.
But possibly the most significant and telling fact is evidence of
substantial differences in incumbent reaction to different kinds
of entrant. When the entrant is either Southwest Airlines or another of the legacy carriers, the price reaction is typically much
smaller, and might be characterized simply as accommodation.
There is substantial evidence that the presence of an LCC on a
given route lowers prices there, even when a hub-incumbent has
a dominant position, 3 6 but there is also substantial evidence
that LCCs other than Southwest cannot survive under those circumstances, because virtually all of them have been liquidated
or acquired by incumbents.13 7
B.

COUNTER ARGUMENTS

A key counter argument might be that despite whatever evidence there may be of airline predation, the carriers have performed poorly. If they are effective long-term predators and
hence monopolists, at least some of them should have flourished. But, superficially at least, they have not. Even the original deregulatory prophets have all acknowledged that
unregulated competition has been unpredictable and problemappear to be above-cost if the comparison is made on the basis of the predator's
total output in the market.
135 The cases are United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116-17 (10th
Cir. 2003), in which Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz supported the government's
predation theory, and Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d
917 (6th Cir. 2005), in which the court was heavily swayed in its decision to reverse summary judgment for defendant by the fact that plaintiff's case was supported by one of the world's leading predation skeptics, economist Kenneth
Elzinga.
136 See Tretheway & Kincaid, supra note 117, at 478-79 (collecting evidence).
137 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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atic, 138 and, predictably, some "destructive competition" advocates say that competition itself is to be blamed.' 39 The situation
promises to grow only worse given this year's spectacular increase in fuel prices. 4 ' Significant scuttlebutt has it that the industry is near another of its epochal, paradigm-shifting
reorganizations, a few of which it has already endured since deregulation (this would basically be the fourth of such reorganizations in thirty years). "Crisis" is the word of the day,1 4 ' and calls
are now made for some sort of reregulation or a system of legalized cartel regulation with antitrust immunity. 142 Whether policy changes arise or not, the industry will very likely change in
some way or another through upcoming mergers.'43
But the legacy airlines' luck since deregulation might be a singularly poor economic metric, even though their difficulties
have persisted for some time and for several reasons. 144 For one
138 Michael Levine, among the more influential early advocates of airline der-

egulation, see Michael E. Levine, Note, Is Regulation Necessary? CaliforniaAir Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416, 1429 (1065),
acknowledged as early as 1987 that it had been premised on undue optimism and
overly simplistic theoretical predictions of the industry's behavior in open competition. See Levine, supra note 93, at 481. See also Elizabeth E. Bailey, Aviation
Policy: Past and Present, 69 S. ECON. J. 12, 14-16 (2002); see also Alfred E. Kahn,
Airline Deregulation-A Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANSP. L.J.
229, 229-30 (1988).
139 See, e.g., Richard D. Cudahy, The Airlines: Destined to Fail?, 71 J. AIR L. & COM.
3, 33-35 (2006) (arguing that the performance of the industry has been so poor,
and that consequences of systemic failure would be so dire, that airlines should
be treated like any "mass transit" industry); Dempsey, supra note 95, at 422, 484;
Rubin &Joy, supra note 103, at 219.
140 See Marks, supra note 105 (taking concerns of industry officials and analysts
about oil prices to support the prediction that "America's aviation system could
be at risk of collapsing by the beginning of next year" and reporting that fuelrelated costs will cause most major airlines to run out of cash around the new
year); Micheline Maynard, 9 Airlines Face Threat of a Credit Downgrade, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2008, at C4 (noting that, as of late May, all major U.S. airlines and several
smaller ones had been placed in precarious credit status by major credit rating
agency).
141 See, e.g., BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, AIRPORTS-DAWN OF A NEW ERA: PREPARING FOR ONE OF THE INDUSTRY'S BIGGEST SHAKE-UPs 3 (2004), http://
www.bcg.com/publications/files/BCGAirportsDawnNewEra.pdf; Cudahy, supra
note 139, at 3; Rubin &Joy, supra note 103, at 227 ("The airline industry is experiencing its greatest changes since deregulation.").
142 See, e.g., Cudahy, supra note 139, at 34.
143 See generally Moss, supra note 125 (discussing recent history of airline
merger activity and likelihood of future mergers).
144 Incidentally, the suggestion has been made occasionally that airlines are
inherently unprofitable because their markets possess "empty cores." The argument is that, because of some special technological or cost characteristic, a partic-
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thing, it might be that the airlines have not actually done that
poorly over time. Industry profitability has arguably tracked the
business cycle, such that the industry was profitable during the
mid-1980s, suffered during the downturn of the early 1990s, enjoyed record profits during the boom of the mid-to-late 1990s,
and now again is suffering quite significantly. 14 5 Explanations
for this trend include that demand, especially for leisure travel,
is uncommonly income elastic; the industry, which must plan
capital investments far in advance, is unusually susceptible to its
own mistakes in macroeconomic forecasting; and during the
burden of
past few decades, the surviving carriers have had 14the
6
competing with carriers undergoing bankruptcy.
Moreover, even to the extent that accounting profits have
been lower than might have been hoped, it can be explained
with no reference to fixed costs, destructive competition, or the
failure of rent-seeking. First, capital investment in the industry
has been distorted by an uncommon degree of subsidization
throughout its entire history (up until the present day). This
was first and foremost a federal policy failure. U.S. carriers subsisted on direct subsidy from their infancy well into the 1950s
and enjoyed more limited direct subsidies even beyond then.
Subsidy and rate-and-entry regulation encouraged two inefficiencies that were individually rational from the carriers' perspective. They systematically overinvested in capacity, and they
negotiated excessive labor agreements.
Even since deregulation, there have been several intermittent
direct federal subsidies in the form of "too big to fail" grants and
loan guarantees. Also, a wholly different source of unhealthy
and distorting subsidy appears to have been the private capital
finance markets. For reasons that remain unclear, markets have
consistently overinvested in the major airlines, contrary to the
advice of industry observers and financial analysts. 47
ular market will possess no set of transactions that can preserve a stable
equilibrium. See Brady & Cunningham, supra note 21, at 8; Cudahy, supra note
139, at 22. Even if the empty core argument had any general plausibility, a basic
refutation of all overcapacity-related arguments is that capacity is a technological
phenomenon that tends to be much more flexible in reality than it is in theoretical models that assume capacity constraints. See Chris Sagers, The Demise of Regulation in Ocean Shipping: A Study in the Evolution of Competition Policy and the Predictive
Power of Microeconomics, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 805-08 (2006).
145 See STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 90 (1995).
146 See id. at 90-91, 105.
147 See Cudahy, supra note 139, at 15.
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Second, the industry's current organization since deregulation has been the subject of an overly tolerant merger policy,
especially during the years when contestability still held sway.
For example, as mentioned above, DOT approved all twenty-one
mergers presented to it during its brief tenure in the early
1980s.48

But maybe more important than any of the foregoing is that
most legacy airlines have been victims of spectacularly poor
management. First, in the early years of deregulation, the majors were the victims of their own perceived ripeness for exploitation in the market for corporate control. It is only too
telling that several of them became junk-bond financed acquisitions of affiliates of Michael Milken and the Drexel Burnham
firm. A reason the airlines may have been uncommonly attractive targets for leveraged buyouts during the heady merger and
acquisitions days of the mid-to-late 1980s is precisely their emergence from deregulation. But, in any case, like other high-risk
acquisitions of that period, they also came to be stuck with large,
long-term fixed payments to service the resulting debt. This fact
may partly explain the spectacular fiasco of Eastern Airlines' demise in the late 1980s;' 49 the closely-entwined suffering of Eastern's sister airline, Continental, during the same period; 150 and
the liquidation of TWA in 2001, which happened to be its third
bankruptcy since deregulation and followed ten straight years of
negative profits. Second, legacy airline managers have, for various reasons, chosen to take on other substantial, competitively
unnecessary fixed obligations, especially including lease obligations. 151 Third, the carriers have persistently struggled with fluctuations in fuel prices, but this problem could have been
avoided. Until this year, fuel had been the majors' second largest single variable cost, and from here forward, it promises to be
their largest. Fluctuations in that cost are therefore among the
carriers' most obvious risks, and protection against that risk
through hedging strategies is feasible and profitable. However,
among the large airlines, only Southwest has done so. Southwest pioneered hedging strategy and has used it astutely, and it
could have been mimicked by other carriers.
See DEMPSEY & GOETZ, supra note 82, at 227.
149 See generally AARON BERNSTEIN, GROUNDED: FRANK
STRUCTION OF EASTERN AIRLINES (1990).
150 See id. at 14-20.
151 See Carstensen, supra note 105, at 492, 500.
148
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Moreover, to the extent that losses have been driven by fare
competition itself, they may have been avoidable. It may be, as
many have claimed, that given their high ratio of fixed-to-variable costs, the airlines face incentives to sacrifice long-term stability for short-term income. 152 But rational business managers
and rational investors, properly incentivized, should foresee that
long-term losses in such a strategy will outweigh near-term gains.
If properly incentivized, then the airlines should not have made
the mistakes that they made (one wonders to what extent failure
to attend to the long-term risks reflects the need of all publiclytraded companies, under current accounting standards and securities law, to show short-term profitability).
Finally, it hardly needs to be stated that during the past seven
or eight years, the industry has suffered an uncommon number
of large misfortunes that on any measure are exogenous, including the single-largest drop in demand in the industry's entire
history (following September 11, 2001).' S
IV.

AIRLINE PREDATION IN THE COURTS

In only one airline antitrust decision, among the several to
work their way through the courts, has a predation claim enjoyed any lasting, meaningful success: the Sixth Circuit panel decision in Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.15 4 However,
plaintiffs there settled before ever reaching the merits. In one
other case, Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
plaintiffs survived summary judgments on the merits of a predation claim, 15 5 but on grounds that have probably been effectively
overturned. 156 And, in any event, plaintiffs in that case lost
before the jury under unfavorable jury instructions.
A.

THE CASES THUS

FAR

Significant judicial attention has been given to at least four
major episodes of airline predation. They were: (1) one of the
more glaring cases so far publicly known-Northwest's response
to the attempt of Spirit Airlines in the early 1990s to penetrate a
152

Brady & Cunningham, supra note 21, at 9; see also Cudahy, supra note 139, at

18.
153

See Bailey, supra note 138, at 18.

431 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment for
defendant).
155 824 F. Supp. 689, 703-04 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (finding plaintiffs claims were
not implausible).
156 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
154
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few routes heavily dominated by Northwest from its hub in Detroit;157 (2) Virgin Atlantic's effort in the early 1990s to initiate

service from Heathrow to several American cities previously
served only by British Airways;15 (3) a campaign by American
Airlines during the late 1990s against various LCC's that sought
to enter routes at American's Dallas-Fort Worth hub; and (4)
the aggressive low-fare pricing plan by American Airlines of the
early 1990s, which plaintiffs Northwest and Continental alleged
interdependent oligopoly
was a scheme to create and discipline
1 59
pricing among all the majors.
B.

PRICE BELOW COST

In airline predation cases, the more difficult issue will normally be price-below-cost. It can be expected that any airline
predation defendant will be among the majors and will be sued
for predation in defense of market power held at a hub. In the
cases so far litigated, every such defendant has held substantial
market share in the challenged markets, and the evidence suggests that entry barriers are high in airline markets. Therefore,
recoupment should be the comparatively easier of the two
showings.
Accordingly, airline predation cases have almost always
turned on a plaintiffs proof of defendant's costs, and the courts
have focused very critical eyes on plaintiffs' presentation of factual evidence.
If, as seems likely, the predation doctrine will continue to depend on short-run price-cost comparison for its fundamental
definition of predation, airline predation plaintiffs will face an
acute problem of proof of costs. So far, most courts have taken
an approach to it that makes their burden very difficult. In a
predation case, it is difficult to distinguish fixed and variable
costs. 160 In airline cases, the problem is acute because the way
that airlines customarily keep accounts is intended to facilitate
management decision models based on fully allocated costs.

Since defendants' own internal records will normally be the only
available evidence as to its costs, plaintiffs will have a very difficult time making the distinction.
See generally Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d 917.
See generallyVirgin At. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d
Cir. 2001).
159 See generally ContinentalAirlines, 824 F. Supp. 689.
16o See Denger & Herfort, supra note 34, at 551 n.74.
157
158
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This problem was demonstrated most sharply in United States
v. AMR Corp.161 Justice Department experts constructed an exceedingly careful, multi-part test purporting to show both that
American's flights on the challenged routes were unprofitable
and specifically that the costs of the incremental capacity added
to combat LCC fares-American added substantial capacity at
very low fares-outweighed the incremental revenue of that added capacity. 162 This followed the approach laid out in an important announcement of Department of Justice (DOJ)
enforcement policy by TEA Chief Roger Fones, which appears
not coincidentally to have been made not long before AMR was
filed.163 The Tenth Circuit rejected the DOJ's work out of hand,
holding that any test of costs that includes any aspect of fixed
costs must fail completely.' 64
AMR demonstrates another common problem. Airlines are
keen examples in which a firm produces more than one product
using common facilities. If only one of the products is challenged as predatory, there may be common variable costs that
can be hard to allocate. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the
enforcement approach laid out by Fones entails comparing only
incremental revenues against incremental costs.' 65 In principle,
such a test could properly segregate the costs because in an airline predation scheme, added capacity will be entirely or mostly
in the lowest fare category.
The court again rejected this approach wholesale, holding
that an airline plaintiff must show that flights as a whole are unprofitable. 166 Only Spirit Airlines seems to have gotten this right,
but one wonders how its rule will hold up over time.1 67

140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001).
Id. at 1173-74.
165 See Fones, supra note 133, at 13.
164 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 2003).
165 Fones, supra note 133, at 13.
166 AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1120.
167 Among the several reasons Spirit Airlines is remarkable is that plaintiffs experts included economists Kenneth Elzinga and David Mills, whose work on predation in part drove the reasoning in Brooke Group. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (suggesting Kenneth G.
Elzinga and David Mills, Testingfor Predation:Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34 ANTITRUST
BULL. 869 (1989), as one possibly appropriate measure for the likelihood of
recoupment).
161
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RECOUPMENT: REPUTATION EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE MARKETS

AND THE TERRORIZING OF CAPITAL

Among the most prominent themes in the newer, mostly theoretical predation literature has been the argument that convincing bouts of predation might be worthwhile investments,
even if the resulting losses cannot be immediately recouped in
the market in question. They can be profitable if they deter entry in other markets where the defendant earns supra-competitive profit. This would seem an obvious and important problem
in airline markets. Moreover, both the financial press and investor informational literature produced by investment advisors
demonstrate that fear of airline predation is taken seriously in
capital markets. And why should it fail to be? Virtually every
new entrant since deregulation has failed or been acquired by a
major, and many of them have been liquidated outright. So airline predation might be a reasonable strategy to deter future
entry into markets other than the one in question if it can dry
up entrants' access to capital.
V.

CONCLUSIONS: GENERALIZABILITY AND
DOCTRINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

All of the foregoing might be fairly academic if it could be
claimed that, by however great a consensus predation has occurred in airlines, that case is really an isolated or sui generis one.
In fact, if that were true, the airlines case would be especially
academic because in this special context, there is already an industry-specific enforcement mechanism in place which appears
to be free to take enforcement action against conduct that
1 68
would not violate the Brooke Group standard.
Admittedly, even those most disposed against predation and
most willing to believe that it should be stopped in the airlines
usually make their case by arguing that the airlines are special
and so should be subject to special (and less lenient) rules. 6 9
168 Namely, DOT can take such action under its § 411 power to constrain "unfair" competition. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., John M. Nannes, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, The Importance of Entry Conditions in Analyzing Airline Antitrust Issues,
Address Before the International Aviation Club (July 20, 1999) (special characteristics of the market "alter the 'cost-benefit' predation calculation for a hub carrier
in a way uncharacteristic of most other industries"); Robert M. Rowen, The Dilemma of PredatoryPricingin the Airline Industry, 13 AIR & SPACE LAw, at 1, 13 (1999)
(arguing that "postulates that airline predatory pricing claims present unique issues under the tests established by Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner in their
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This gives hope to some believers in predation policy, who note
that the Supreme Court has never considered a predation claim
in a network industry1 70 and has not strictly closed the door on
the idea that its predation rules might be subject to some modi17
fication in some special cases. '
But there are reasons to believe that the airlines case is not so
special and that the surfeit of evidence there does not reflect the
industry's special susceptibility to predation. I might merely reflect the very large amount of interest that academics have had
in it. The case for this is simple and calls for no lengthy elaboration, though admittedly it calls for answers to some empirical
questions that are testable in principle but remain inadequately
tested. The predatory prowess of the legacy airlines does not
obviously depend on any technological, regulatory, or organizational peculiarity of their markets. Instead, that majors can
price predatorily reflects several resources that might exist in
many industries. Perhaps most importantly, they have enjoyed
entry-protected market power since at least the late 1980s. Second, they are sophisticated price discriminators. A predatory
price need impose losses on them in only one or a few very narrow product and geographic markets. But as has been repeatedly observed through the history of debate on predation, this is
likely true of all sorts of markets. Next, several reasons suggest
that they can exploit reputational effects. Neither entrants nor
capital markets can easily ascertain incumbents' true costs, but
they can easily ascertain the long and largely uninterrupted succession of entrant bankruptcies. Again, no particular technological, organizational, or regulatory characteristic obviously limits
this phenomenon to the airlines. So long as a large, multi-market incumbent has some market power and ability to discriminate, it could be profitable to terrorize entrants and capital with
predatory signals. Finally, the major airlines enjoy network externalities that appear to facilitate market power and also may
give greater impact to loyalty programs. But each of these traits
is common in many industries and are not obviously dependent
on technological factors or government interference.
seminal 1975 article and suggests that a more flexible judicial approach is
necessary").
170 See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 95.
171 See generally supra Part I.A.
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